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Abstract: On 5 October 2015, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) released the final package of measures to reform the
international tax system under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The
BEPS project pursued 15 Action Items that concerned a broad range of international
tax topics, centered around three themes: coherence, substance, and transparency and
certainty.
The Action Plan to implement the BEPS project seeks to align taxation with economic
activity and ensure that taxable profits cannot be artificially shifted. Action Item 6 of
the Action Plan identifies treaty abuse (particularly, treaty shopping) as a principal
source of concern because it enables taxpayers to gain access to tax treaty benefits in
situations where the benefits were not intended.
This Note reviews the results of the finished BEPS project, specifically focusing on
Action Item 6. I find that the BEPS project made remarkable progress considering the
scope and complexity of the undertaking, as well as the political and corporate interests
involved. While the efforts of the OECD have been impressive in scope, ambition, and
the ability to find common ground on this issue, the results of the BEPS project thus far
are insufficient to truly address the problem identified in Action Item 6. Moreover,
significant challenges await the OECD before it can achieve the goal that it established
for this effort.

* Tyler H. Lippert earned a PhD from the RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California. In his
dissertation, he uses a risk governance framework to explore the risk associated with climate change from
the perspective of NATO. He also holds a JD from Northwestern University School of Law, and a
Master's Degree from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Tyler served
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 5 October 2015, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) released the final package of measures to reform the
international tax system under the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project. 1
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance strategies
that exploit mismatches in international tax rules to avoid taxation or to shift
profits to low- or no-tax locations. 2 The BEPS project seeks to provide
international guidelines to address this problem. 3
Mismatches arise when national tax laws are not coordinated across
borders, and the resulting inconsistencies provide the opportunity to avoid
taxation. For instance, there is no international consensus on the allocation
of income (for tax purposes) for products developed in one country but sold
in a second country by a business located in a third country. 4 The BEPS
project is founded on the idea that progress in addressing international tax
avoidance can only be achieved through enhanced multilateral cooperation. 5
While some mismatches occur unwittingly, others may be designed
intentionally to undermine the tax regulation of other jurisdictions. 6 Indeed,
analysis performed by Anthony Ting of the University of Sydney showed
that “the U.S. Government knowingly facilitated the avoidance of foreign
income tax by its multinational enterprises, thus creating double nontaxation.” 7 The BEPS project foreshadows potentially significant change in
the nature and operation of international taxation.
The BEPS project is a key point in the transition from an international
tax system based on bilateralism to a collaborative international regime. 8
1 Newsroom, OECD, OECD to Release BEPS Package for Reform of the International Tax System
to Tackle Tax Avoidance on Monday 5 October 2015 (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/
oecd-to-release-beps-package-for-reform-of-the-international-tax-system-to-tackle-tax-avoidance-onmonday-5-october-2015.htm; OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013),
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.
2 OECD,
ABOUT
BASE
EROSION
AND
PROFIT
SHIFTING
(BEPS)
(2015),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm.
3 OECD, supra note 1; Testimony of Pascal Saint-Amans Director, Centre for Tax Policy and
Administration, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Before the United
States Senate Committee on Finance (2014), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony
%20of%20Pascal%20Saint-Amans.pdf.
4 Hearing on Ways and Means International Tax Reform Discussion Draft: Hearing Before the H. S.
Comm. On Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. On Ways & Means, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) [hereinafter
House Hearing] (statement of Paul W. Oosterhuis, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP).
5 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Evaluating BEPS: A Reconsideration of the Benefits Principle
and Proposal for UN Oversight, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 185, 194 (2016).
6 NICHOLAS SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS: TAX HAVENS AND THE MEN WHO STOLE THE WORLD
233 (2012) (attributed to a conversation with Richard Murphy).
7 Antony Ting, iTax — Apple’s International Tax Structure and the Double Non-Taxation Issue, 2
BR. TAX REV. 40, 71 (2014).
8 Pasquale Pistone, Coordinating the Action of Regional and Global Multilateralism in International
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Participation in the BEPS project was not limited to OECD member states,
and “the effects are intended to have a broader geographical scope than past
[OECD] model treaty updates.” 9 An international tax system based upon
bilateral treaties creates competition among jurisdictions to attract corporate
residents for tax purposes. 10
By at least one account, international tax has never known a more
exciting era. 11 Others believe that the BEPS project represents “an
unprecedented challenge” to the status quo regarding “the taxation of crossborder investment.” 12 Though any changes in the international tax regime are
likely to be gradual, they will nonetheless impact government revenue
collection as well as the attractiveness of jurisdictions to host corporations;
in turn, they will affect jobs and economic influence. 13
The BEPS project pursued fifteen Action Items that concerned a broad
range of international tax topics. 14 These were centered around three themes:
coherence, substance, and transparency and certainty. The Action Items
identify areas of concern for OECD governments. 15 According to the OECD,
the international tax issues addressed in the BEPS Action Plan are among the
most difficult ones confronted by the international tax regime. 16 The
sweeping scope of the project is at once impressive and unrealistic.17
This Note reviews the results of the finished BEPS project. In particular,
Tax Law, WORLD TAX J. 3, 3 (2014).
9 Marie Sapirie, The Impact of BEPS Implementation for U.S. Tax Planning, 149 TAX NOTES 594
(Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/newsanalysis-impact-beps-implementation-us-tax-planning/2015/11/02/16965211.
10 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2000); see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Nicola Sartori, Symposium on
International Taxation and Competitiveness: Foreword, 65 TAX L. REV. 313, 316 (2012).
11 Yariv Brauner, BEPS: An Interim Evaluation, WORLD TAX J. 10, 10 (2014).
12 H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM & JOSEPH P. BROTHERS, THE INTERSECTION OF US TAX TREATY
POLICY, TAX REFORM AND BEPS (2015), http://www.capdale.com/files/16375_The%20intersection%20
of%20US%20tax%20treaty%20policy,%20tax%20reform%20and%20BEPS.pdf.
13 See Avi-Yonah & Sartori, supra note 10, at 320.
14 These 15 items include the following: Address the tax challenges of the digital economy;
Neutralize the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements; Strengthen controlled foreign corporation rules;
Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments; Counter harmful tax practices
more effectively, taking into account transparency and substance; Prevent treaty abuse; Prevent the
artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status; Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line
with (value creation; intangibles, risks and capital; and other high-risk transactions); Establish
methodologies to collect and analyze data on BEPS and the actions to address it; Require taxpayers to
disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements; Re-examine transfer pricing documentation; Make
dispute resolution mechanisms more effective; and Develop a multilateral instrument. OECD, supra note
2.
15 Michael Plowgian, BEPS: The Shifting International Tax Landscape and What Companies Should
Be Doing Now, THE TAX EXECUTIVE, 2013, at 255.
16 Hugh J. Ault, Wolfgang Schon & Stephen E. Shay, Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: A Roadmap
for Reform, 68 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 275 (2014).
17 See Brauner, supra note 11, at 37–39.
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it focuses on Action Item 6 and provisions that seek to eliminate treaty abuse
(specifically, the limitation on benefits (LOB) provisions).18 The
international tax efforts of the OECD have not previously included
provisions of this nature. While the efforts of the OECD have been
impressive in scope, ambition, and the ability to find common ground on this
issue, the results of the BEPS project thus far are insufficient to truly address
the problem identified in Action Item 6. Moreover, significant challenges
await the OECD before it can achieve the goal that it established for this
effort.
II. BACKGROUND OF INTERNATIONAL TAX - PROBLEMATIC
NATURE
Historically, international tax treaties were conducted on a bilateral
basis, each treaty modified to the specific circumstance. In 1872, Britain and
Switzerland concluded the first double taxation treaty. 19 Transaction taxes
and other international capital controls emerged during World War I to
capture tax revenue to finance the war (they also prevented capital flight).20
Capital controls decreased thereafter but returned at least partially during the
Great Depression, and they were integrated into the Bretton Woods system
following World War II. 21 Governments progressively dismantled these
controls starting in the 1970s. 22
As long as there have been taxes, there has been tax avoidance both
domestically and internationally. Inconsistencies among bilateral treaties
create opportunities for exploitation (such as double nontaxation). The
ensuing opportunities for tax avoidance are widely recognized.
One particularly famous case concerns William Vestey (later, 1st Baron
Vestey), an Englishman who transformed a Liverpool butchery business into
a multinational meat-processing conglomerate (at one point the largest
private conglomerate in the world) in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 23 The
18 “ACTION 6, Prevent treaty abuse: Develop model treaty provisions and recommendations
regarding the design of domestic rules to prevent the granting of treaty benefits in inappropriate
circumstances. Work will also be done to clarify that tax treaties are not intended to be used to generate
double non-taxation and to identify the tax policy considerations that, in general, countries should consider
before deciding to enter into a tax treaty with another country. The work will be co-ordinated with the
work on hybrids.” OECD, supra note 1.
19 Sunita Jogarajan, The Conclusion and Termination of the “First” Double Taxation Treaty, 3 BR.
TAX REV. 283, 283 (2012).
20 SHAXSON, supra note 6 at 57–58; Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent”
of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997).
21 Christopher J. Neely, An Introduction to Capital Controls, FED. RESERV. BANK ST. LOUIS REV.
13, 13 (1999).
22 Id. at 13.
23 Stuart Millar & Alex Brummer, Heirs and disgraces, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 1999),
https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/aug/11/features11.g2.
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Vestey family was once Britain’s wealthiest business dynasty, as well as “the
country’s most astute tax avoiders.” 24 Through a tax avoidance scheme
centered on a trust in Paris, their chain of butcheries paid 10 British Pounds
of tax on a profit of 2.3 million British Pounds in 1978. 25
Growing concern in many OECD countries about tax shelters and other
tax avoidance schemes motivated their governments to ask the OECD to
undertake the BEPS project. The 2009 financial crisis raised awareness about
international tax avoidance, and brought the consequences into focus.
Moreover, it created the platform for widespread popular concern.
Knowledge of extensive tax avoidance, which shifts the burden of taxation
onto smaller businesses and less sophisticated taxpayers, brought popular
resentment and anger to the surface. 26
Increasing media attention on international tax avoidance, and the
corresponding public awareness, prompted political action. 27 Legislative
hearings throughout this period gained widespread attention and laid bare the
extent to which large multinationals escaped taxation. 28 As a result, G20
governments asked the OECD to lay the foundation for an internationally
coordinated and collaborative tax regime. 29 According to the OECD, revenue
losses from BEPS are estimated at $100 billion to $240 billion annually. 30
A large number of U.S. multinationals have subsidiaries in tax havens
or banking secrecy jurisdictions. 31 According to the Congressional Research
Service, U.S. multinationals report a disproportionate share of profits in taxpreferred countries. 32 U.S. multinational corporations reported earning 43%
of their overseas profits in the country group comprised of Bermuda, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, while having less than 4%
of their foreign employees in those locations. 33
Congressional testimony provides further detail on the legislative intent
to allow for tax minimization strategies and suggests that tax authorities need
not concern themselves with the impact of tax rules on the revenue of other
24

Id.
SHAXSON, supra note 6, at 44–45.
26 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 255.
27 Id.
28 See generally Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before
the Permanent S. Comm. on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs,
113th Cong. (2013) [hearinafter Apple Hearing].
29 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 255. Two policy tools to prevent double taxation are the OECD Model
Income Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
30 OECD, POLICY BRIEF: TAXING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (BEPS) 1 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/policy-brief-beps-2015.pdf.
31 JAMES R. WHITE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL
TAXATION: LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS AND FEDERAL CONTRACTORS WITH SUBSIDIARIES IN
JURISDICTIONS LISTED AS TAX HAVENS OR FINANCIAL PRIVACY JURISDICTIONS 4 (2008).
32 MARK P KEIGHTLEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42927, AN ANALYSIS OF WHERE AMERICAN
COMPANIES REPORT PROFITS: INDICATIONS OF PROFIT SHIFTING (2013).
33 Id.
25

544

DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE)

9/10/17 8:49 PM

OECD BEPS: Action Item 6
37:539 (2017)

countries. 34 The U.S. Congress employed this approach when it obstructed
the U.S. Treasury and the IRS’s efforts to write regulations that would limit
the use of the check-the-box rules to achieve foreign tax minimization. 35
Congress thereafter codified the permissibility of foreign-tax minimization
when it enacted United States Code Section 965(c)(6), which allowed
multinational corporations to minimize their foreign taxes without giving rise
to a domestic tax liability. 36
Opportunities to avoid tax internationally are not limited to the United
States; neither are the resulting problems. European nations, who suffered a
slow recovery following the financial crisis, have been assertive in
addressing the problem. 37 For instance, France created a task force to create
recommendations to address tax matters related to the digital economy. 38
British and Italian revenue agencies scrutinized Google, Amazon, Facebook,
and Apple. 39 Australia also criticized the tax avoidance schemes of
technology companies. 40
III. INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE: THE BASICS
A variety of widely acknowledged transactions demonstrate the extent
of international tax avoidance. A particularly well-known transaction (for
U.S. companies), the “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich,” 41 was pioneered by
Apple, Inc. 42 However, other technology companies later used it, 43 until it
was closed in 2014. 44 This arrangement allowed companies to take advantage
of a U.S.–Irish Treaty and an Irish law that provides “an exemption from the
Irish withholding tax for royalty payments to a European Union (EU)
member state.” 45
In this arrangement, a U.S. company shifts its intellectual property
34

House Hearing, supra note 4.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 255.
38 PIERRE COLLIN & NICOLAS COLIN, TASK FORCE ON TAXATION OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY,
REPORT TO THE MINISTER FOR ECONOMY AND FINANCE, THE MINISTER FOR INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY, THE
MINISTER DELEGATE FOR THE BUDGET AND THE MINISTER DELEGATE FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
ENTERPRISES, INNOVATION, AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013).
39 KEIGHTLEY, supra note 32, at 1–2.
40 Gary Hufbauer et al., The OECD’s “Action Plan” to Raise Taxes on Multinational Corporations
3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 15-14, 2015).
41 Dave Davies, How Offshore Tax Havens Save Companies Billions, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, 2011.
42 Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2012, at A1.
43 Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership
Nationality, 68 TAX L. REV. 207, 209 (2014).
44 Stephen Castle & Mark Scott, Ireland to Phase Out “Double Irish” Tax Break Used by Tech
Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2014, at B1.
45 Steven A. Bank, The Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1307, 1312 (2013).
35
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rights outside the United States to an Irish subsidiary, headquartered in
Bermuda. The headquarters then sublicenses the intellectual property rights
to an Irish operating company (distinct from the subsidiary), which receives
the profits in Ireland. 46 However, these profits are reduced by the
sublicensing fees paid by the Irish operating company to the headquarters in
Bermuda (delivered through yet another subsidiary registered in the
Netherlands). 47
This arrangement worked to reduce income tax significantly
(particularly in Europe). However, closure of the provision is but a small
deterrent; corporate taxpayers can achieve significant tax avoidance through
other strategies that take advantage of the low corporate tax rate in Ireland. 48
Anthony Ting noted that Irish law pairs well with that of the United States to
create a company that is not a tax resident in any country. Because the United
States defines corporate tax residence according to place of incorporation,
while Ireland uses the location of central management and control, a
company incorporated in Ireland with central management and control in the
United States is a tax resident of neither country. 49
Ireland has other characteristics that make it an attractive jurisdiction
for international tax structures. It has a corporate tax rate of 12.5%, and
because it is an EU Member State, subsidiaries established in Ireland can
avail themselves of EU laws that allow them to avoid corporate tax as well
as value added tax in other EU Member States where they do business (which
often have higher tax rates). 50
Using these elements (though not the double Irish strategy, per se), from
2009 to 2012, Apple, Inc. avoided U.S. $44 billion in taxes. 51 By creating
subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions like Ireland, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, and the British Virgin Islands (some little more than a
letterbox), Apple allocated about 70% of its profit to overseas jurisdictions,
significantly reducing the tax it paid around the world. 52
Apple is not the only multinational benefiting from the mismatching tax
46

Davies, supra note 41.
Id.
48 Ting, supra note 7, at 40.
49 Id. at 46.
50 Id. at 54.
51 Apple Hearing, supra note 28, at 8 (statement of Sen. John Mccain, Permanent S. Comm on
Investigations); Ting, supra note 7, at 40 (“The double non-taxation of the profits was achieved primarily
by the combined effect of the following: Definitions of corporate residence in Ireland and the US; Transfer
pricing rules on intangibles; Controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regime in the US; Check-the-box
regime in the US; and Low-tax jurisdiction.”).
52 Duhigg & Kocieniewski, supra note 42; see also Tracy A. Kaye, The Offshore Shell Game: U.S.
Corporate Tax Avoidance Through Profit Shifting, 18 CHAPMAN L. REV. 185 (2015); Offshore Profit
Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 (Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the Permanent S. Comm. on
Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 23 (2013)
(statement of J. Richard Harvey, Professor, Villanova University School of Law).
47
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rules. 53 Google used the Double Irish Dutch Sandwich strategy to avoid
approximately $2 billion in worldwide income taxes in 2011 by crediting
$9.8 billion in revenue (80% of its pre-tax profit) to a Bermuda company. 54
Microsoft indicated that “it had benefit[ed] partly from a policy of channeling
sales through low-tax regional centers in Ireland, Singapore and Puerto
Rico.” 55 Starbucks also used these techniques, prompting the observation that
its “opacity of international tax planning, [leads to a situation] in which
neither investors nor the tax authorities in any particular jurisdiction have a
clear picture of what the firm is up to.” 56
At the same time, Europe suffered through the worst period of the global
financial crisis, which increased political awareness about tax avoidance
among multinationals. This circumstance compelled the observation in the
U.K. that “if Google doesn’t pay [its tax], somebody else has to pay or
services get cut.” 57 The revelation that Google avoided significant amounts
of tax prompted audits in France and Italy. 58 Germany, France, and other
countries “want the [tax] revenue, and their taxpayers are disgusted by the
constant stories of multinational companies paying low (and even
nonexistent) taxes.” 59
As the Double Dutch Irish Sandwich transaction shows, particularly in
regard to the mobility of intellectual property rights, the current international
tax rules were not designed for the modern digital economy. International
standards (such as those by the OECD, the UN, or even the United States)
have not adapted to the international and technology-driven modern business
environment. 60 The changing nature of international business and commerce,
increasing in pace and technological sophistication, challenged the ability of
national tax administrations to adapt the international tax regime
accordingly. 61
The instances of digital giants Apple, Google, and Microsoft were the
53 Marie Sapirie, As American As Apple, 139 TAX NOTES 1095 (June 3, 2013); Lee A. Sheppard,
Apple’s Tax Magic, 139 TAX NOTES 967 (May 27, 2013).
54 Jesse Drucker, Google Revenues Sheltered in No-Tax Bermuda Soar to $10 Billion, BLOOMBERG,
December, 2012.
55 Richard Waters, Microsoft’s Foreign Tax Planning Under Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2011; see
also Kaye, supra note 52; Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 1 (Microsoft and Hewlett
Packard): Hearing Before the Permanent S. Comm. on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Sec.
& Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 64 (2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, Permanent S.
Comm. on Investigations).
56 Edward D. Kleinbard, Through a Latte Darkly: Starbucks’s Stateless Income Planning, 139 TAX
NOTES 1515, 1516 (June 24, 2013).
57 Drucker, supra note 54.
58 Id.
59 Jeremy Scott, Can The United States Kill BEPS?, FORBES, June 16, 2015.
60 OECD, INFORMATION BRIEF: OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT (2015).
61 Building a Competitive US International Tax System: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 114th
Cong. 1–2 (2015) (Statement of the Pamela F. Olson, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
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“triggering cases” for the BEPS project. Media attention revealing the extent
of their tax avoidance gave rise to public hostility that served as the impetus
for the BEPS initiative. 62 That the United States is the origin and host of
many of the largest technology companies (Google, Microsoft, Apple) makes
it particularly interested in the taxation of intangible products (technologyrelated IP and support). While treaty shopping can be problematic generally,
the mobility of intellectual property rights makes them particularly easy to
shift across jurisdictions. 63 Perhaps for that reason, “[i]t is not surprising that
U.S. multinationals shift profits to low tax countries, as the U.S. maximum
statutory corporate income tax rate of 35% is among the highest in developed
countries.” 64
IV. ACTION ITEM 6, OECD BEPS PROJECT: ELIMINATE
TREATY ABUSE
The principal insight of the OECD BEPS project is to develop a more
uniform and coordinated international tax regime. The BEPS project is based
on the idea that coordination of national efforts is necessary to reduce and
eliminate double nontaxation, as well as to protect against double taxation. 65
By targeting harmful tax practices, the BEPS project asks corporate
taxpayers to disclose assiduous tax planning arrangements, as well as adhere
to reporting requirements that disclose the income, economic activity, and
taxes paid to tax administrations on a country-by-country basis. 66
The BEPS Action Plan seeks to align taxation with economic activity
and ensure that taxable profits cannot be artificially shifted. 67 Action Item 6
of the Action Plan identifies treaty abuse (particularly, treaty shopping) as a
principal source of concern in this regard. 68 This Action Item offers model
treaty provisions and recommendations for tax laws to prevent corporate
taxpayers from accessing treaty benefits inappropriately. 69
Treaty shopping is a primary driver of BEPS concerns. “Treaty
shopping” refers to a circumstance where a taxpayer seeks to obtain benefits
under a tax treaty despite not being a resident of a state included in the treaty
(benefits are generally reserved for residents, or other qualified entities, of
the two states of a bilateral treaty). Taxpayers pursue these strategies by

62

Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 71 (2014); Brauner, supra note 11, at 27.
Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing
Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2008).
64 Ting, supra note 7, at 54.
65 Ault, Schon, & Shay, supra note 16, at 276.
66 OECD, supra note 30.
67 Id.
68 OECD, PREVENTING THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS IN INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES,
ACTION 6: 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).
69 Id.
63
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establishing a “shell company” (also referred to as letterbox companies or
conduits) in a state with a desirable tax treaty, through which taxpayers avail
themselves of the beneficial treaty provisions. 70
Treaty shopping enables taxpayers to gain access to treaty benefits in
situations where the benefits were not intended. This undermines tax
sovereignty and deprives states of tax revenue.71 Tax sovereignty refers to
the ability of governments to raise revenue through taxation to support
themselves, provide public goods, and protect their population from physical
or economic harm. 72 That is, “taxation is an inherent or essential component”
of sovereignty, and the ability to levy taxes and collect the resulting revenue
is plausibly “an inherent right or entitlement attaching to sovereign status” to
such an extent that “infringing on the right of taxation is an infringement on
sovereignty itself.” 73
The crux of the challenge addressed by the OECD, however, is that
“[m]ajor theoretical developments in tax policy are now arising . . . through
the interactions of nongovernmental actors in transnational settings.” 74 As a
result, even the largest countries cannot independently enforce their tax laws
under the status quo. 75 As Steven Bank observes,
[T]he ease in moving corporate assets [(particularly intellectual
property rights in the high tech industry 76)] and the malleability in the
definition of legal home, combined with a few tax-friendly
jurisdictions, makes it increasingly difficult for countries to
unilaterally maintain the integrity of their separate corporate tax
systems except in the case of purely domestic corporations. 77

The “Limitations on Benefits” (LOB) provision included in the final
BEPS report addresses this problem specifically. LOB provisions consist of
treaty provisions and domestic rules to prevent usage of tax treaties (and
access to the corresponding benefits) in inappropriate circumstances. LOB
provisions provide a means through which treaty shopping and inappropriate
tax avoidance can be prevented.
70 OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT 2015 FINAL REPORTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 12 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-frequently-askedquestions.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
71 OECD, supra note 68.
72 Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 99, 104
(2009).
73 See id. at 104–06; Jinyan Li, Tax Sovereignty and International Tax Reform: The Author’s
Response, 52 CAN. TAX J. 141, 141 (2004).
74 Christians, supra note 72, at 99.
75 Brauner, supra note 11, at 59.
76 A key component of the tax strategy used by Apple, Inc. is the transfer of Apple’s intellectual
property rights to an Irish subsidiary under a cost-sharing agreement. U.S. multinationals have employed
the technique to shift profits to low-tax countries since the 1970s. Ting, supra note 7, at 47.
77 Bank, supra note 45, at 1312.
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The United States has long recognized the problem of treaty shopping.
However, only in May 2015 did the U.S. Treasury propose language
addressing the issue to be included in the U.S. Model Tax Treaty. In May
2015, the U.S. Treasury Department released proposed revisions to the U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention (“U.S. Model”), 78 among which included an
article dedicated to limitation on benefits. 79
Few countries other than the United States use a LOB measure to
address cases where a corporate taxpayer attempts to circumvent limitations
imposed by a tax treaty. 80 Parillo characterizes the impact of these changes
as preventing residents of third countries from inappropriately obtaining the
benefits of a bilateral tax treaty and enabling the U.S. Treasury or its treaty
partner to curtail benefits if a change in domestic tax rates are made after a
treaty is signed. 81
The U.S. delegation to the OECD advocated for the BEPS project to
address treaty shopping with a U.S.-style LOB provision. 82 The release of the
U.S. provision was intended to influence the BEPS initiative. 83 The Final
BEPS Report includes a LOB provision similar to those included in the U.S.
Model. As such, the U.S. LOB provision served as the prototype for the
OECD. 84

78 Four of these provisions concern treaty shopping; the other (concerning expatriated entities) is
specific to the United States—it seeks to deter inversions (where a corporation becomes a subsidiary of a
company in another country in order to avail itself of favorable tax laws) by denying treaty benefits for
expatriated companies. No similar provisions appear in the BEPS package; as a result, it will not be
discussed in this paper. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Treasure Releases Select Draft Provisions for Next
U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty (May, 20 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/jl10057.aspx (last visited Apr. 7, 2017) (describing the proposals). U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/treaties.aspx.
79 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX
CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE 28 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/
Documents/Treaty-Subsequent-Changes-in-Law-5-20-2015.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SELECT
DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE 1 (2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Exempt-PermanentEstablishments-5-20-2015.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S.
MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE 3 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Special-Tax-Regimes-5-20-2015.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, SELECT DRAFT PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION: NEW ARTICLE
22 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/Treaty-Limitationon-Benefits-5-20-2015.pdf.
80 Japan and India also use LOB measures. See OECD, supra note 68, at 20.
81 See Kristen A. Parillo, Model Treaty Proposals Reflect Dramatic Change in U.S. Policy, 147 TAX
NOTES 868 (May 25, 2015).
82 See Kristen A. Parillo & Lee A. Sheppard, OECD Panel Explores Treaty Abuse, 143 TAX NOTES
1118 (June 9, 2014).
83 Sapirie, supra note 9, at 594.
84 David D. Stewart & Kristen A. Parillo, OECD’s LOB Approach Needs Refinement, Practitioners
Say, 143 TAX NOTES 313 (Apr. 21, 2014).
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The Final BEPS Report reflects agreement among the participating
states that interested countries must meet a minimum OECD standard to
prevent treaty shopping. 85 While acknowledging the need for flexibility for
each country, and the circumstances of the bilateral treaty negotiations,86 the
minimum standard requires countries to include in their bilateral tax treaties
a principal purpose test, a limitation on benefits provision (supplemented
with domestic anti-abuse rules), or both.
The minimum standard seeks to ensure that treaty benefits are available
only to entities entitled to them. 87 The standard requires that only true
residents qualify for treaty benefits (implemented through limitation on
benefits rules, as well as principal purpose test (PPT) rules). 88 The OECD
proposed a three-pronged approach. It recommends (1) including a statement
in tax treaties that the States (parties to a treaty) wish to prevent tax
avoidance, (2) including an LOB rule in the model treaty, and (3)
incorporating a general rule that uses the principal purpose test. 89
The Final BEPS Report included a draft LOB and principal purpose
provisions (with accompanying commentary). However, the LOB in the
Final Report departs from a U.S.-style LOB by including a general antiavoidance rule based on a main purpose test. 90 The following is a summary
of the OECD recommendation:
First, a clear statement that the States that enter into a tax treaty intend
to avoid creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation
through tax evasion or avoidance, including through treaty shopping
arrangements will be included in tax treaties . . . .
Second, a specific anti-abuse rule, the limitation-on-benefits (LOB)
rule, that limits the availability of treaty benefits to entities that meet
certain conditions will be included in the OECD Model Tax
Convention. These conditions, which are based on the legal nature,
ownership in, and general activities of the entity, seek to ensure that
there is a sufficient link between the entity and its State of
residence. . . .
Third, in order to address other forms of treaty abuse, including treaty
shopping situations that would not be covered by the LOB rule
described above, a more general anti-abuse rule based on the principal
85

OECD, supra note 68, at 9.
Id.
87 Id.
88 OECD, Videos:Multimedia Examples of How the OECD/G20 BEPS Project will Revise
International Tax Rules, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-2015-final-reports.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2017).
89 J.P. Finet, BEPS Treaty Provisions Need More Work, Treasury Official Says, 149 TAX NOTES 502
(Oct. 26, 2015).
90 Stewart & Parillo, supra note 84.
86
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purposes of transactions or arrangements (the principal purposes test
or “PPT” rule) will be included in the OECD Model Tax Convention.
Under that rule, if one of the principal purposes of transactions or
arrangements is to obtain treaty benefits, these benefits would be
denied unless it is established that granting these benefits would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the provisions of the
treaty. 91

The Final Report recommends language to clarify that tax treaties do
not intend to create opportunities for double nontaxation. Since 1977,
Article 1 of the OECD Model Treaty included a statement that tax treaties
should not help tax avoidance or evasion. 92 Here, the OECD provides further
clarification, and it encourages a clear statement in the title of a treaty that
the prevention of tax avoidance is a purpose of tax treaties. It also
recommends that a preamble expressly indicate that the treaty intends to
“eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or
reduced taxation . . . .” 93
Article 10 of the Final Report provides language for the LOB rule,
which tests whether a taxpayer is eligible for treaty benefits.94 This test
evaluates factors such as legal structure, ownership, or business activity to
ensure a legitimate connection between the taxpayer and the state of
residence. 95 The Final BEPS Report indicates that further work is needed to
refine the LOB rule (final versions of the rule will be completed in 2016). 96
As noted above, the treaty abuse effort includes two approaches. The
first reflects U.S. desire to ensure that the principal purpose test sought by
the Europeans was not the only solution to treaty shopping. The United States
succeeded in having a scaled-down LOB provision included, although no
countries subscribe to it other than in the context of a U.S. treaty. 97
Seemingly as a compromise between insistence on an LOB provision
and the concern that this model is too complicated, 98 the Final BEPS Report
also contains provisions for a simplified LOB rule (which provides a
mechanism to evaluate standard cases of treaty shopping); however, it is
complemented by the PPT to address cases not covered by the simplified
91

OECD, supra note 68, at 9.
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OECD MODEL INCOME TAX TREATY CONVENTION (1977).
93 OECD, supra note 68, at 19. The Commentary to the OECD Model includes language referring to
the BEPS project and the intent to address BEPS concerns arising from treaty shopping arrangements. Id.
at 13.
94 Id. at 55. The 2015 Final BEPS Report defines “qualified persons” entitled to treaty benefits. Id.
at 23.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 3. For this reason, the LOB rule, and related Commentary, in the Final Report is subject to
change pending further review.
97 Lee A. Sheppard, Barking At The Moon and Battling Treaty Abuse, 147 TAX NOTES 1248 (June
15, 2015).
98 Parillo & Sheppard, supra note 82, at 1118.
92
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rule. Thus, the treaty abuse measure in the Final BEPS Report consists of a
simplified LOB clause with a backstop to allow tax authorities to prevent
treaty benefits for a transaction with a “main purpose” of (inappropriately)
taking advantage of the treaty. 99
V. ANALYSIS
A. Diverging Views on the Principal Purpose Test
That the OECD included an anti-abuse provision modeled on the U.S.
LOB measure, and that the provision should also include a general anti-abuse
rule based on a main purpose test, generated controversy. 100 Attendees at a
public consultation held by the OECD voiced a variety of concerns.
U.S. participants feared that an LOB provision with a main purpose test
would “cause uncertainty, discourage cross-border investment, undermine
the purpose of tax treaties, and reverse much of the work that the OECD has
done to reduce trade barriers.” 101 Several speakers suggested that “the
advantages of a clear set of objective, mechanical tests like those offered
under a U.S.-style LOB provision would be completely undone by a main
purpose clause.” 102
A clear set of objective, mechanical tests like those in a U.S.-style LOB
provision offers clarity on how the treaty provisions apply and whether treaty
benefits will be available. 103 While a U.S.-style LOB can be complex to
negotiate and draft, it provides predictability; a main purpose test requires
fewer words, but it does not provide as much certainty. 104
B. Potential Conflict with European Union Law
Further, some experts raised serious concern that the OECD BEPS antitreaty shopping measures could violate the right to freedom of establishment
(regardless of motive) and restrict the free movement of capital in the
European Union. 105 European Union law neither requires member states to
impose corporate income tax nor does it require those states that do to do so
at any specific level, regardless of whether it results in double non-

99 Kristen A. Parillo, U.S Views on Treaty LOB and Main Purpose Test Draw Skepticism, 143 TAX
NOTES 426 (Apr. 28, 2014).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Parillo & Sheppard, supra note 82, at 1118.
104 Id.
105 Christiana HJI Panayi, The Compatibility of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Proposals with EU Law, 70 BULL. INT’L TAX’N 1 (2015).
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taxation. 106 Member states are not required to adapt their tax systems to
eliminate juridical double taxation (as opposed to economic double
taxation). 107 Under the same reasoning, if double nontaxation is the result of
parallel and nondiscriminatory taxation by member states, European Law
does not prohibit it, no matter whether tax advantages accrue to the
taxpayer. 108
Moreover, the loss of tax revenue that results from double nontaxation
has not yet been allowed as a justification to restrict fundamental freedoms
of the European Union, such as freedom of establishment and the free
movement of capital. 109 Neither has the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
equated a tax saving that results from disharmony of tax rules among member
states as tax avoidance or evasion. 110 Only to the extent that the activity
would be viewed as abusive is there a legal basis for action by the European
Union. 111
Simple tax forum shopping is not considered abusive under the case law
of the ECJ. 112 For abusive structures, where the intermediary is a sham (if
there is no genuine exercise of establishment in the jurisdiction, nor
movement of capital), the protection afforded by the fundamental freedoms
does not hold. 113 However, the more economic substance to the activity, the
more likely the intermediary can avail itself of the right to freedom of
establishment, and its investment activity will be protected under the right to
free movement of capital. 114
C. International Cooperation: How Much is Enough?
Other experts criticized the BEPS project and its outcome more
fundamentally, noting that “upholding [BEPS] requires cooperation by too
many jurisdictions.” 115 The BEPS project attempts to improve the system of
taxation remain rooted in the idea that income is earned in the country where

106

Id.
Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. The author cites a variety of cases in this article to support this claim.
110 Id.; see also Filip Debelva et al., LOB Clauses and EU-Law Compatibility: A Debate Revived by
BEPS?, 24 EC TAX REV. 132–43 (2015).
111 Panayi, supra note 105.
112 See Id. (citing Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, 2006
E.C.R. 1-7995).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, Global Taxation After The Crisis: Why BEPS And MAATM
Are Inadequate Responses, And What Can Be Done About It 1, 3 (Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 494, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2716124. This is known as the “benefit principle.” See id. at 32.
107
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the business activity takes place. 116 This perspective is increasingly difficult
to reconcile with globally integrated supply chains for products that draw
value from intellectual property registered in locations other than where it is
created, while individual components are manufactured or assembled in
countries other than where they are sold, by corporations that lack physical
presence in any of them.
The BEPS project does not elaborate on the concepts of residence and
source or directly address the issue of where profit is earned. 117 Even using
the independent entity theory (used in the BEPS project), where international
tax works from the assumption that constituent entities of a multinational
corporation are independent and transact with each other at arm’s length,118
the difficulty in assigning value to the income earned at any point along a
globally integrated process quickly becomes evident.
Moreover, the perspective of taxing corporate income in the country
where the business activity takes place has served as the basis for the modern
international tax regime for nearly a century, and consequently it is
embedded in several thousand bilateral tax treaties as well as the domestic
law of most countries. 119
Should a system or methodology be created to perform the task (such as
one based on single-entity perspective), it is equally understandable that it
will require extensive multilateral coordination to develop and a strong
commitment to enforce the regime to succeed. As dysfunctional and underequipped as the current regime might be, even gradual replacement will
likely meet resistance from countries and multinationals who favor it.120
At the same time, the guidelines developed in the BEPS project only
apply to members of the OECD and G20. 121 To the extent that income is
sourced in countries that are not members of these organizations (and chose
not to adopt the rules), multinationals can seemingly avoid the outcome of
the BEPS project. 122
In that respect, for the project to succeed, it would need to be more
inclusive. That 60 nations participated in the BEPS project and contributed
to the development of the international tax environment is an achievement.
While this is a step toward increased multilateralism and inclusiveness for
international tax law, participating countries represented less than a third of
the 193 members of the United Nations.
116

Id. at 2.
Id. at 5.
118 Id. at 6; see also The BEPS Monitoring Group, Overall Evaluation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project (Oct. 5, 2015), https://bepsmonitoringgroup.wordpress.com/
2015/10/05/overall-evaluation.
119 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 115, at 3.
120 Id. at 4.
121 Id.
122 Id.
117
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As a result, the possibility remains for tax competition between the
nations who participated in the BEPS project, and those that did not. 123
Additionally, the two-year time horizon under which the BEPS project was
conducted was insufficient for anything but the first step in the intended
evolution of global tax governance. 124
D. Unfinished Business & Enforcement
At the conclusion of the BEPS initiative in October 2015, Article 10 in
the Final BEPS Report was placeholder text, with explanatory commentary
to give an indication of the principles. The actual provision in the BEPS
report was undrafted, reading “The drafting of this Article will depend on
how the Contracting States decide to do so.” 125 The timeline for drafting a
new OECD Model is not clear. Given the number of participants involved, it
could be several years before the final version is ready. Moreover, another
drawback to an LOB approach is that it would likely take “decades for
countries to update their treaties through renegotiations.” 126
For these reasons, the ultimate effect of this is uncertain, given that the
Article is not drafted, and that provisions also often require implementing
action by member states. 127 Thus, the provisions created by the OECD are
not automatically effective, and for that reason the BEPS project cannot
result in perfect harmonization of global tax systems. 128 Indeed, a
proliferation of LOB articles of different varieties could result in “over
complexity in the treaties or domestic legislation,” 129 as well as inconsistency
among nations.
One potential problem in a multilateral system is that there is no
supranational authority to validate that countries abide by the spirit of the
agreement. As a result, implementation and enforcement could be uneven
and potentially arbitrary. Moreover, even if the recommendations of the
BEPS project are implemented as outlined in the Final Report, nothing
prevents multinationals from creating or identifying new techniques to evade
tax.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The OECD BEPS project seeks to bring coherence to domestic tax rules
123

Id. at 8.
Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 115, at 4–5.
125 OECD, supra note 68, at 21.
126 Stewart & Parillo, supra note 84, at 313.
127 Ajay Gupta, United States and Business Remain Unsure About BEPS, 148 TAX NOTES 1054 (Sept.
7, 2015).
128 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 257.
129 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 5, at 13.
124
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that affect cross-border activities. 130 While the BEPS project was an
impressive effort, the 2015 Final BEPS Report does not rise to this level of
ambition. The Final BEPS Report is an achievement in the sense that it
reflects agreement among participating countries (a larger body of
membership than previous OECD initiatives) to ensure treaties include the
means to prevent treaty shopping. It reflects a desire among these states to
have a minimum standard to protect against treaty abuse. 131
The achievement in this respect is that an LOB provision was included
in the first place, rather than the actual content of a provision. However, the
BEPS project nonetheless increased concerns of uncertainty across the
international tax landscape, “because it may lead to modifications to the longstanding international tax standards established by the OECD.” 132
The United States plays a pivotal role in the international tax arena as a
result of its historic economic influence and that many of the largest
multinational corporations are of U.S. origin. The effectiveness of the BEPS
provisions, and how they impact U.S. corporations are two of the most salient
explanatory factors in understanding how much support the United States
will ultimately provide to the OECD in the context of the BEPS project.
Though its influence is potentially weaker now than at any point in several
decades, the participation and support of the United States is critical to the
ultimate success of the BEPS initiative.
A. Impact for U.S. Multinationals: Indications
While some experts suggest that the OECD BEPS project likely will not
directly affect U.S. tax treaty policy or its interpretation, 133 others note that
even if the new OECD Model Convention does not grow into a multilateral
tax treaty, it will have a significant impact. Some accounts indicate that the
draft BEPS reports shifted the international tax landscape. Citing a 2014
report from PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Peterson Institute for International
Economics indicated that more than 30 unilateral measures had been taken
in the wake of draft BEPS reports, mostly to the disadvantage of U.S.
multinationals operating in low-tax jurisdictions. 134 The Peterson Institute
also predicted in 2015 that if the United States were to implement the BEPS
actions, many U.S. multinationals would relocate their headquarters to tax-

130

OECD, supra note 68, at 3.
Global Tax Alert, Ernst & Young, OECD Releases Final Report Under BEPS Action 6 on
Preventing Treaty Abuse (Oct. 20, 2015) (All tax work at the OECD takes place on the basis of consensus;
if one member objects, no action can take place), http://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/
international-tax/alert—oecd-releases-final-report-under-beps-action-6-on-preventing-treaty-abuse.
132 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 255.
133 Sapirie, supra note 9, at 594.
134 Hufbauer et al., supra note 40, at 1.
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friendly jurisdictions (as well as to move their R&D activity offshore).135
B. Will the United States Sign-On?
One further point of concern is that the United States indicated in 2014
that it will not sign a treaty that combines a simplified LOB clause with a
principal purpose clause. 136 Action Item 6 of the BEPS project establishes a
minimum standard to prevent treaty abuse, in particular treaty shopping. The
Final Report includes recommendations to meet the standard, recognizing
that model provisions must be adapted for individual countries. The
minimum standard requires that countries include in their treaties a PPT, a
PPT in combination with a LOB provision, or a LOB provision along with
rules targeting conduit financing arrangements. 137 The simplified rule is
intended for countries that employ an approach that combines a LOB rule
and a PPT. 138
While the United States does not like the main purpose approach, it
nevertheless uses one to deny treaty benefits using doctrines such as
developed in Aiken Industries v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971). 139
Moreover, the effectiveness of the PPT depends heavily on the decisions of
tax authorities and courts; to the extent that developing countries lack the
institutional capacity and other resources to employ it effectively, or
appreciate the original intent and perspective, it could be problematic. 140
C. U.S. Influence in International Tax
The international context that shapes the posture of U.S. international
tax policy has changed throughout the past decade. Economic growth in the
developing world, and in China, has altered the stature of the United States
in the global economy. Forces at play in the international tax regime are
likely to change as a result. An international tax expert testified to Congress
that
[w]hen the United States had a dominant role in the global economy,
we were free to make decisions about our tax system with little regard
to what the rest of the world did. As a practical matter, our trade
partners generally followed our lead in tax policy. That is no longer

135

Id. at 19, 29.
Sheppard, supra note 97, at 1248.
137 OECD, supra note 68, at 10.
138 Id. at 22.
139 Kristen A. Parillo, ABA Section of Taxation Meeting: Stack Previews Final BEPS Reports, 74 TAX
NOTES INT’L 585 (May 19, 2014).
140 Avi-Yonah and Xu, supra note 115, at 14.
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the case. 141

By virtue of economic influence, the current international tax regime
was created and maintained by the largest economies of the past century. The
United States was the center of the global economy during that period; for
that very reason, the United States was the most influential in the
international tax landscape. While previously the European countries might
have acquiesced to American leadership (demands) on tax issues, the fallout
of the most recent financial crisis suggests that they are less willing to do so
now. Indeed, Pascal Saint-Amans, the OECD official who led the effort,
described the Final BEPS Reports as an “end run around the United
States.” 142
Moreover, China is increasingly influential. 143 The nature of economic
cooperation with China is likely to be an increasingly significant factor for
many OECD member states. The diverging perspective on related issues has
the potential to create a fissure, and this fissure is dangerous for OECD
governments because the lack of uniformity allows an opportunity for
multinational corporations to exploit the rules in ways that can result in
double non-taxation.
D. Concluding Thoughts
Many criticized the Final BEPS Report for failing to deliver on its level
of ambition, and being “mainly aimed at patching up the existing system.” 144
Independent commentators noted the influence of tax advisers and
representatives of multinational corporations, 145 and lamented that the desire
to preserve tax breaks to support national “competitiveness” and the need for
consensus among participating countries produced a report that represents
only the lowest common denominator of their collective interests. 146 By at
least one account, the BEPS project achieved very little:
The result is that the proposals will make international tax rules even
more complex, and largely retain the scope for countries to offer tax
breaks, while raising compliance costs for MNEs, yet preserving the
systemic incentives for them to devise avoidance structures. The
consequence of weak coordination will be an acceleration of unilateral
measures: some have already been initiated by countries such as the
UK and Australia, and other countries are likely to follow, to protect
141 Building a Competitive US International Tax System: Hearing Before the Senate Finance
Committee, supra note 61.
142 Lee A. Sheppard, OECD Head Takes a BEPS Victory Lap, 149 TAX NOTES 340 (Oct. 19, 2015).
143 See Brauner, supra note 62, at 63.
144 The BEPS Monitoring Group, supra note 118, at 10.
145 Id. at 1.
146 Id. at 3.
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their tax base. 147

Nonetheless, the BEPS project is not the final destination in
international tax reform but only the opening salvo in the process of
modernizing global tax governance. 148 It made remarkable progress
considering the scope and complexity of the undertaking, as well as the
political and corporate interests involved.
The road ahead for BEPS looks like a bumpy one, and it is unclear how
much will be achieved. However, international cooperation through the
OECD BEPS project offers the most promise for the “survival of
international standards to prevent double taxation of cross border income,
and to provide the certainty businesses need to invest.” 149 The lack of
coherence in the international tax system has allowed for tax avoidance over
the past century. While the impact of BEPS-related changes on taxpayers
remains dependent on consistency in implementation, 150 if brought to a
successful conclusion, the BEPS project remains the most promising
initiative to bring greater coherence to the international tax regime.
VII. POSTSCRIPT
This paper was conceived in mid-2015, in the months preceding the
October 2015 meeting when G20 Finance Ministers endorsed the OECD
BEPS package. The OECD moved forward on the BEPS project since that
point, with apparent success. On 7 June 2017, the OECD hosted a signing
ceremony for the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). During the
ceremony, 67 countries signed the Multilateral Instrument (MLI). As of 17
August 2017, 71 countries had signed.
The MLI provides a mechanism to implement the tax treaty-related
measures under Actions 2 (hybrid mismatches), 6 (treaty abuse), 7
(permanent establishments), and 14 (mutual agreement procedures) of the
BEPS project. For Action 6 of the BEPS Action Plan, the minimum standard
requires that countries:
• Include in their tax treaties a statement that their common intent is to

eliminate double taxation without creating opportunity for nontaxation or reduced taxation via tax evasion or avoidance, including
through treaty-shopping; and
• Address treaty shopping by, at a minimum, implementing (i) a
147

Id. at 4.
Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 115, at 4.
149 Plowgian, supra note 15, at 255.
150 Sapirie, supra note 9, at 594.
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Principal purpose test (PPT), (ii) a PPT and a simplified or detailed
limitation on benefits provision (LOB), or (iii) a detailed LOB,
supplemented by a mechanism (treaty-based or otherwise) to address
conduit arrangements not already covered in the tax treaty.
To determine how the MLI affects a bilateral treaty between two
signatory countries requires an examination of the provisions ‘reserved’ (optout) by those two countries. Where either country opted out of a provision,
it doesn’t apply.
The United States did not sign the Multilateral Instrument. The United
States has pre-existing anti-abuse measures in its treaties; thus, the lack of
signature is not anticipated to undermine the MLI. Countries that signed the
MLI must ratify the instrument through their domestic processes. The MLI
will take effect once ratified by five countries.
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